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Abstract
his paper examines the consequences of land reform
for communal livestock farmers in Namaqualand. It
investigates the likely outcomes of recent commonage
acquisitions and tenure reform in the former Coloured
Reserves using case study material drawn from the Leliefontein
communal area. In particular, we try to answer two questions
about land reform in Namaqualand. The first is concerned with
models of land management in both new and old common
lands: what effect will the imposition of either a commercial or
communal land management model have on twin objectives of
poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability? We
conclude that the commercial farming model is rarely
appropriate in Namaqualands communal areas and suggest that
sustainable development is more likely under a flexible system
which takes account of both the objectives of communal farmers
and the constraints under which they operate. The second
question explores the implications of recent policy shifts
regarding the use of commonage as a stepping stone for
emergent black commercial farmers. We ask if this is feasible in
the Namaqualand context and conclude that present rates of
grant are inadequate to provide incentives for emergent
commercial farmers to move off the commons. The
contradictions inherent in using the commons for both poverty
alleviation and as a stepping stone are likely to result in a
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Communal livestock farming in Namaqualand 
a brief background
ecent local government reforms have amalgamated the
previous district of Namaqualand with the Hantam Karoo
to form one District Municipality in the Northern Cape
Province. Leliefontein is one of six communal areas
(former Coloured Reserves) in Namaqualand administered
under the Rural Areas Act 9 of 1987. Namaqualand covers
48,000 km2 (4.8 million ha) of which 27% is communal1 and
53% commercial farmland. Conservation areas (5%), state land
(8%) and areas owned by mining companies (7%) cover the rest.
The area has about 77,000 inhabitants, the overwhelming
majority of whom are coloured people of mixed Nama descent
(81%). There are 412 privately owned commercial farms with an
average size of 11,650 ha. In contrast, more than four times as
many households (1748) own livestock in Namaqualands
communal areas on a total land base of about half the size of
that used by the Districts commercial farmers (SPP 1997). The
fact that privately owned commercial farmland is owned almost
exclusively by whites and the overcrowded communal areas are
R
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inhabited by coloureds is an obvious legacy of colonial and
apartheid policies.
Much has been written about the history of the communal
areas in Namaqualand  the fact that they have served as labour
reserves for the white commercial farming and mining sectors
since the mid 19th century is well documented. Throughout the
20th century the reserves remained socially, politically and
economically marginal, existing primarily as overcrowded
refuges for migrant labourers and their families. During this
time, peasant agriculture provided a supplement and a safety
net for many communal residents, in spite of the fact that
traditional transhumant patterns of grazing were curtailed
within an overcrowded and inadequate area of land.
Both colonial and apartheid polices deliberately restricted the
ability of communal farmers to survive from agricultural activity
alone. By confining many farmers to small communal reserves
and curtailing opportunities for seasonal transhumance,
peasant agriculture became a relatively unimportant activity
among a suite of livelihood options involving low-paid wage
labour in the Districts commercial farming and mining sectors.
As a result, many families adapted livelihood strategies which
included, but did not entirely depend upon a low input, limited
capital, labour intensive, risk averse livestock farming system.
The result was that a large number of small-scale farmers had to
find ways of coexisting within a limited area of communal land.
Consequently, stocking rates within the Leliefontein communal
area have been persistently above the recommended carrying
capacity since the 1950s, if not longer. The impact of over 50
years of continuous heavy grazing has been a loss of palatable
perennials and the incursion of poisonous plants such as
Galenia africana (known locally as kraalbos).
Neighbouring large-scale commercial farmers have been
generously subsidised throughout much of the 20th century.
Low interest loans, grants for fencing and infrastructure, debt-
relief, drought assistance and de-stocking incentives have
enabled commercial farmers to maintain low stocking rates,
especially during the last 50 years. The resulting fence-line
contrasts between communal and commercial land are often
cited as evidence of the effects of overgrazing as opposed to
sustainable use. But the causal links to overgrazing cannot be
reduced to a simple equation of stock units per hectare: it is
more accurate to link the differences in vegetation to a history of
political oppression that created the disparities between
commercial and communal landscapes, socio-economic
conditions and land management practices in the first place.
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Comparing the socio-economic objectives of
communal and commercial stock farming
Communal and commercial stock farmers in
Namaqualand are operating in the same ecological
environment2, but with contrasting management aims. In
the commercial system, livestock (which are almost
exclusively sheep) are raised for the production of meat to be
sold within national agricultural markets. An optimal stocking
rate in this system gives maximum growth per animal during its
first year of life, predictable lambing rates, low mortality and off-
take of a high quality finished meat demanded by the market.
It is commonly claimed that a commercial economic unit in
Namaqualand typically entails one owner keeping a minimum of
700 sheep on a farm of between 8000 and 12,000 ha. Net
incomes for such an economic unit range from between R6,000
and R8,000 per month3 depending on variables such as rainfall,
land productivity and market fluctuations. Such farms tend to
be highly capitalised due to inflated land prices4 and the costs
associated with the erection and maintenance of fencing5 and
several pumps for dispersed ground water supplies.
Furthermore, Namaqualands commercial farmers often mimic
the transhumant patterns of early Nama pastoralists by owning
two or more agricultural holdings located in different agro-
ecological zones, enabling them to move between farms in
response to drought or seasonal climatic variation, thus
reducing the risk inherent in this dryland environment.
Namaqualands communal livestock farming sector on the
other hand has multiple production objectives. In the first place,
milk and meat are important elements in household food
security. Secondly, sheep and goats provide capital storage (e.g.
to pay for school fees, medical emergencies etc.), while in many
cases donkeys provide draught power for transport and cropping
operations. Optimal production strategies seek to maximise
herd size at high stocking densities, following a dynamic,
opportunistic pattern of herd size fluctuation depending on
climatic variation.
Communal farmers keep livestock for a variety of purposes
and this is expressed in the large variation in herd size and in
multiple ownership.  In Paulshoek village, Leliefontein6,
between 2,000 and 4,000 sheep and goats graze an area of
20,000 hectares, the equivalent of two average sized commercial
farms. A total of thirty herds vary in size from between 13 and
173 small stock with a mean of 82 goats and sheep.7  In at least
a third of these, more than two people have combined their
C
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animals to form a single herd.  In one well-documented case
(Marinus 1997), twelve people, most of whom are related in
some way or another to the owner, lay claim to at least one
animal in the herd of 170 animals.  Many of these vicarious
owners do not live in Paulshoek but retain links with their
extended village family through occasional visits during holidays
or over weekends. Apart from providing additional food and
livelihood opportunities, livestock are a form of social capital
which contributes a significant element to the cohesion and
vitality of village life.
Not only are production objectives radically different in
commercial and communal grazing systems, so too are livelihood
strategies. Unlike many commercial farmers, few communal
farmers are wholly dependent on livestock for their income.
Evidently there is not enough land available for most stock
farmers to increase herd size to the point of providing a
sufficient family income. A chronic land shortage is one factor
among many which motivates individuals (often men) to seek
work on commercial farms, in the regional mining sector or in
the informal economy of Namaqualands towns. Most communal
area households are characterised by an extended family
network often scattered throughout Namaqualand providing
multiple sources of household income including remittances
from migrant labourers, pensions, casual labour and self-
employment. Such diverse livelihood strategies provide the
mainstay of many communal farmers household income. For
many families in the Leliefontein communal area, owning
livestock acts as a buffer or an insurance against unemployment
or failure to receive sufficient income by other means.  A recent
study in Paulshoek (Global Change 1999a; 2000), shows that
income from livestock sales, added to the value of milk and
slaughter animals consumed, only amounts to approximately
6% of village income. But in an economy where average per
capita monthly income is less than R250 (average monthly
household income = R1, 242) the contribution of small herds of
livestock becomes significant.
Half of Paulshoeks households own livestock.  On average,
livestock owners receive higher incomes (+34%) than non-
livestock owning households. This is partly explained by the fact
that livestock owning households have four times as much
income on average from permanent jobs and self-employment
and twice the income from remittances as households without
livestock. However, at least 30% of this differential can be
attributed to the additional income derived from farming
activities.
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In Leliefontein village8 the wealthiest livestock owners have a
monthly household income of R3, 050 coming from multiple
sources. These households, representing 6% of the total, own
300 sheep and goats on average. The poorest group (also
representing 6% of households) has an average monthly
household income of approximately R300 and possess only 33
sheep and goats. However, the overwhelming majority (87%) of
communal stock farmers in Leliefontein own between 66 and 84
small stock and have average monthly household incomes of
around R1,400. This group depends mainly on welfare grants
(41% of households in the total sample), migrant labour (20%),
temporary jobs (10%) and family support (5%). Only 10% of
these households depend on livestock as the most important
source of household income with herds averaging 84 sheep and
goats (Anseuw et al, 1999).
Comparing communal and commercial rangeland
management systems
ommunal farmers continue to use a system of livestock
husbandry based on kraaling and (limited) stock post
mobility, in contrast to the camp system used by
commercial farmers. Kraaling is a traditional and rational
way of using unfenced rangeland by multiple herds. Individual
farmers move with their grazing animals during the day and
return them to a pen at a stock post each night. Stock posts can
be moved to take advantage of better grazing conditions
elsewhere. Traditionally, rangeland management was dependent
on seasonal transhumance and periodic migration in order to
maximise the grazing potential of herds which fluctuated in size
in response to climatic events. Kraaling can be typified as a
labour intensive and risk averse strategy within an open
rangeland utilised by many separate herds.
The commercial camp system differs from this in that fenced
portions of rangeland are managed by individual farmers whose
animals are left unattended in paddocks, both day and night.
Here, rangeland management depends on conservative stocking
rates and rotational grazing between camps in order to maintain
the productive potential of the vegetation and a constant
sustainable offtake or crop of livestock. Camping is capital
intensive with low labour inputs where the high risks of
mortality by predators are offset by high production values.
Not only does communal farming have different production
objectives to that of commercial farming, but the factors which
C
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determine environmental sustainability in either the kraaling or
camping system are also different. Debates about the
environmental effects of kraaling versus camping are highly
complex and beyond the scope of this paper to address in any
detail. However, we argue that in the communal kraaling
system, management decisions relating to stock post mobility
and the periodic resting of the veld are more important to
maximising livelihood options and environmental sustainability
than the maintenance of low intensity fixed stocking rates (set
to a nominal carrying capacity) as advocated in the commercial
ranching or camp system.
Agricultural policies in Southern Africa have been dominated
by the thinking behind the commercial ranching model, even in
the context of communal areas (Boonzaier 1987, Abel & Blaikie
1989, Barrett 1992, Scoones 1992). Policy makers perceive the
communal farming sector as inefficient, unproductive and
overstocked. Hence, policies tend to focus on the control of stock
numbers within a defined carrying capacity in order to increase
the productivity of each individual animal and to avoid
overgrazing.  But communal livestock farmers are generally not
interested in reducing their livestock numbers because many of
them already have too few animals and restrictions on livestock
numbers will only lead to further impoverishment. They find
themselves between a rock and a hard place - the lack of
alternatives to this constitutes the real tragedy of the commons
in Namaqualand.
Communal rangeland is often stocked at between 150% and
200% above the recommended carrying capacity. Average herd
sizes are typically 80 to 120 goats and sheep - enough to provide
only a meagre income. The economic incentives to expand
individual herd sizes is constantly thwarted by the limitations
inherent in an inadequate natural resource base. During
periods of high rainfall, herd sizes expand rapidly and provide a
large surplus whereas during droughts, communal herds suffer
severe losses because there are few natural fodder reserves to
fall back on. From the perspective of this double bind, it is not
surprising that communal farmers do not have the same
perception of the relationship between overstocking and
vegetation degradation as commercial farmers and policy
makers. From their point of view, the problem is not
overstocking but a shortage of land. Given the colonial and
apartheid history of land alienation and inequality that
underscores this situation, it is not an unreasonable argument.
Rangeland management is primarily dependent on two
variables: (1) the productivity objectives which determine
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 7
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stocking rates and (2) the long-term impact of stocking rates on
the environments productive potential. Recent studies in the
Leliefontein communal area provide some data on these two
variables (Global Change 2000). In the village of Paulshoek for
example, where approximately 30 farmers graze up to 20,000 ha
of communal land, stocking densities have ranged between 3
and 10 ha per Small Stock Unit (SSU) during the last 30 years
and show a clear correlation with variation in annual rainfall
(Figure 1).
Privately owned commercial farms bordering Paulshoek are
typically between 4,000 and 12,000 ha in size. Here the
stocking rates are more stable, varying from between 10 and 14
hectares per SSU depending on landscape vegetation
characteristics rather than on climatic fluctuations. In terms of
maintaining live animals, the communal system is more
productive when averaged out over the medium term, but more
vulnerable to mortality during drought. Yearly lambing
percentages are up to 3 times higher in the commercial system,
while off-take (sales and consumption) per hectare is roughly
equivalent (even in a year with up to 24% mortality due to
drought in communal herds as opposed to 6% mortality due to
drought in adjacent commercial farms).9




































































Figure 1.  Mean annual rainfall (mm) (histograms) for
Springbok (1971-1996) and Paulshoek (1997-1999) and the
number of sheep and goats in Paulshoek, Namaqualand
from May 1971 to December 1999.
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Table 1: Comparison of data from communal and commercial




No. of livestock owners 61 1
No. of herds 28 1
Ha per SSU 7.5 11.9
Weaning % (during drought) 25% 79%
Inputs very low moderate
Off-take: Rands per ha1 R9.2 R8.8
Gross income per ewe R68 R105
Death due to predators (98-99) 9% 16%
Death due to drought  (98-99) 24% 6%
1The current exchange rate is approximately 1US$ = R7
Such figures show that there is at least some parity in the
value of off-take per hectare between communal and commercial
production systems, despite the continuous high stocking rates
and degradation incurred by communal farmers. The concept
of land degradation remains problematic however and depends
on individual perceptions and evaluations of landscape
condition. Degrees of degradation are typically evaluated
according to vegetation composition and cover. Comparisons of
vegetation cover, species diversity, palatability and soil fertility
between densely stocked communal areas such as Paulshoek
and neighbouring commercial farms suggests that land
degradation (in their sense) in the short to medium term is a
consequence of continuous high stocking densities within a
confined area.10 However, if degradation is defined according to
monetary values of secondary productivity (see Table 1 which
indicates a slightly higher off-take per ha in the communal than
the commercial area), then it is hard to identify degradation in
Paulshoeks communal rangeland, since stocking levels have
been sustained during the last 50 years at levels equal to if not
higher than adjoining commercial farms.
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Colonial and apartheid land reform initiatives in
Namaqualand
or over a century the socio-economic and environmental
circumstances prevalent throughout Namaqualands
communal areas (poverty, unemployment, high population
density, intensive grazing) have been interpreted as
fulfilling all the criteria for a tragedy of the commons scenario.
This is in fact how Namaqualands communal areas are typically
represented. But this image only survives by ignoring the
greater tragedy of political oppression and the imposition of a
long succession of unsuccessful, inept agricultural and land-use
policies.
Agrarian reform of Namaqualands communal areas has been
proposed repeatedly since the mid-19th century, primarily by
individuals with a vested interest in privatising the commons in
the form of economic units or privately owned and managed
farms (Price 1976; Luyt 1981; Leeuwenburg 1972, SPP 1995).
Governments toyed with this idea throughout the 20th century.
It was embodied in a series of policies, enacted in legislation and
finally enforced in the 1980s. The Coloured Rural Areas Act of
1963 made provision for the sub-division of non-residential land
which could be hired out to so-called bona fide farmers (Kröhne
& Steyn 1991). In 1984, it was decided to subdivide the
Leliefontein reserve into 47 economic units, the rationale being
that privatisation of land would encourage entrepreneurship
and the development of the region, since lessees would run
farms profitably (Archer et al 1989). Privatisation would lead to
more developed farming techniques, to conservation of the
area, and subsequently this development would rid the area of
the whimsical and irrational traditions which were retarding
development (Kotze et al 1987, Archer et al 1989).
The 47 farming units established in 1984 for the Leliefontein
Coloured Reserve ranged from 1,500 ha to 6,175 ha, depending
on the local ecological conditions, with a mean size of 3,248 ha.
Thirty units were rented to individuals or syndicate groups,
while the remaining 17 units were reserved for communal use.
The majority of people who were granted economic units had
other sources of income - they were typically shop owners,
teachers and mine workers (Kröhne & Steyn 1991).
Most of the communities in the Namaqualand reserves never
accepted the economic units initiative because it further
marginalised the majority of communal farmers. In Leliefontein,
popular resistance against this scheme was widespread
F
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(Boonzaier 1987) and communal farmers successfully contested
the issue in 1988 when they won their case in the Supreme
Court on legal technicalities.
Post-apartheid land reform
oday, for the first time since the advent of colonialism, the
government is taking a proactive role in promoting the
social and economic advancement of the majority of the
rural population in Namaqualand (in accordance with its
Constitutional obligations). The achievements of land reform are
highly symbolic of this effort to reverse the legacies of poverty,
oppression and marginalisation. Since 1994, the communal
land-base of Namaqualand has been expanded by 19% as the
government has purchased privately owned commercial farms as
new commonage, now owned and administered by the districts
various municipal authorities. Efforts to transform and
restructure the formal regulation of communal farming have
gone hand-in-hand with this expansion. At the time of writing,
this process is underway and in flux - the outcome will have
enormous implications for the future of communal livelihoods
and sustainable land-use.
Land reform in South Africa consists of three sub-
programmes:
Land Redistribution which enables poor and disadvantaged
people to gain access to land has until recently been effected
primarily through a Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant11 of up
to R17, 000 per household. In Namaqualand however, this grant
would purchase enough land for only 15 small stock, hardly
enough to form a meaningful supplement to a subsistence
income. For the communal residents of Namqualand therefore,
the primary means of land redistribution has been the
acquisition and expansion of municipal commonage - privately
owned commercial farmland purchased by the Department of
Land Affairs (DLA) and transferred to the ownership of local
authorities such as the Leliefontein Transitional Council.
Land Restitution involves returning land, or compensating
persons or communities who were dispossessed of property after
1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.
This provision does not apply in Namaqualand because for most
places (with the exception of Richtersveld) land alienation took
place prior to that time.
Land Tenure Reform aims to bring all people occupying land
under a unitary, legally validated system of land holding. Little
progress has been made in this regard at a national level.
T
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However, due to sustained NGO support and focused
collaboration, the State managed to promulgate tenure reform
legislation that seeks to address the land holding and tenure
administration of 23 so-called Coloured Rural Areas in the
Western Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and Free State.
These areas are home to 70 000 people and is 1.7 million
hectares in extent.
To simplify what is in reality a complex legal situation, land
reform in Namaqualand has taken place primarily in two ways:
1) Through the redistribution of privately owned land to the
TLCs of the reserve areas, as commonage.  The
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) has provided a
Municipal Commonage Grant to TLCs of the reserve areas
to extend or create commonage for the benefit of poor and
disadvantaged residents. The TLCs became the owners of
such land with the explicit purpose that it should be made
available to residents at non-commercial rates equal to the
costs incurred in maintenance and administration.
2) Through tenure reform of the communal areas previously
known as Coloured Reserves or Coloured Rural Areas.
These Reserve lands continue to be administered under
the Rural Areas Act 9 of 1987 and land in these areas is
held in trust by the State on behalf of the inhabitants.
This act will be repealed by the Transformation of Certain
Rural Areas Act 94 of 1998 after a transition period of 18
months which makes provision for the transfer of the land,
either to a local authority or to other legal entities such as
Communal Property Associations (CPAs), Trusts, Voluntary
Associations or to individuals.
Some uncertainty arises in this context, with the reorganisation
of local government throughout South Africa.12 While the
boundaries of the Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) and the
communal Act 9 Areas (or Reserves, or Coloured Rural Areas)
coincide at present, they have been re-demarcated, reducing the
number of TLCs from 11 to 4 new municipalities. They will
therefore soon become much larger entities than the old TLCs
which governed individual Act 9 Areas such as Leliefontein,
amalgamating communal, commercial and urban municipal
land within one local government unit. This poses a whole set of
new problems as to who will own and control both the new and
old commonage  a subject which is beyond the scope of this
paper to address.13
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This outline merely skims the surface of the legal situation,
but it is vital for the following discussion to distinguish between
these two differently constituted forms of communal land: the
old Act 9 Areas which formerly constituted the Coloured
Reserves and the new municipal commonage created under
post-apartheid land reform legislation.
Managing the commons
he new commonage lands were intended as enlargements
to the chronically overstocked communal village lands
resulting from apartheid policies. Two stipulations were
attached to this initiative, with important social and
environmental implications. In the first place, the beneficiaries
of the new commonage were specifically identified as poorer,
disadvantaged households. Secondly, beneficiaries (communal
farmers) and owners (municipalities) had to agree to a binding,
sustainable management plan. Commonage Committees
(Meentkomitees) were created in order to achieve these
objectives as democratically based advisory panels to the Local
Authorities. In the context of Namaqualand, the underlying goal
of the Meentkomitees has been to:
transform commonage management (for both the old Act
9 Areas and the newly acquired commonage) from a
system based on top down remote (currently absent)
control and unilateral enforcement, where the costs of
commonage maintenance was carried by rate paying
residents (whether they used the commonage or not) and
ad hoc grants from central government, to a system
based on participative rule making, for management to
be guided by a five year management plan and for
users to be held accountable for the payment of the
management and maintenance costs of the commonage
(Pienaar 2000:334).
Thus, the commonage policy in Namaqualand has had three
distinct though inter-related strands: social equity,
environmental sustainability and the restructuring of
commonage management.
Meentkomitees (MK) have been created according to varying
circumstances in each Act 9 Area although in general, the
process has followed a similar pattern in each. Mass meetings
have led to decisions on the composition of the MK and the
T
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election of MK representatives, after which constitutions and
codes of conduct have been adapted, leading to the election of
office bearers and regular MK meetings. In Leliefontein the MK
is composed of nine community members, one from each
village14 plus one member from the Department of Agriculture.
One of the first tasks of the MKs has been to collect
information on the veld conditions of the commons, numbers of
farmers and livestock, an inventory of existing infrastructure,
details of current farmer practice in relation to grazing fees and
record keeping, as well as input from farmers on current
problems and expectations. Subsequent management plans
devised by MKs in each of the Act 9 Areas are in different stages
of development. Three pilot areas (Concordia, Pella and
Steinkopf) are relatively advanced and management plans have
been adopted by their respective TLCs. The organisational and
legal difficulties inherent in creating democratically accountable
management systems where they have been defunct for several
generations should not be underestimated. The input and
reports made by facilitating NGOs such as Surplus People
Project and the Legal Resources Centre in setting up the
Commonage Committees highlight the many difficulties in
creating a system based on collective and individual
responsibility for infrastructure and environmental
sustainability.
One of the most positive outcomes of this approach has been
that the management plans of the three pilot areas have
incorporated both the old and new commonage under one
system of management (Northern Cape DOA & SPP 2000).
Because strict management plans have been a prerequisite to
accessing the new commonage (including a grazing agreement
limiting stock numbers to official carrying capacity), it has acted
as an incentive for farmers to agree to registration, user fees and
grazing controls across the commons as a whole. Part of the
explanation for this resides in the fact that the new commonage
land constitutes a significant addition (up to 75%) of the original
commons in the three pilot areas. Communal farmers have
recognised the advantages in lowering stocking densities by
expanding the land base and have consequently agreed to user
fees, a quota system which limits total stock numbers (according
to carrying capacity)15 and to forego the automatic rights of
grazing which previously accompanied rights of residence. When
given the choice between flexibility accompanying minimal
regulation and the imposition of controls aimed at enhancing
productivity, communal farmers choose increased regulation of
the commons as long as the land base is expanded sufficiently
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to accommodate both productive and social objectives. How this
will limit the opportunities of prospective farmers or the desire
of existing small-scale farmers to expand their herds remains to
be seen.
Leliefontein differs from the three pilot areas in several
respects. In the first place it straddles several distinct agro-
ecological zones with ten discrete villages. This adds a level of
logistical complexity to an already complex organisational
problem. Secondly, to date the additional commonage amounts
to less than six percent of the total area16 and is concentrated
on the northwestern side of the Leliefontein communal area,
many kilometres and several hours drive from the villages on the
coastal plain. As a result of these difficulties, the Leliefontein
MK has been unable to amalgamate the old and new
commonage under one management plan. Instead they have
devised grazing agreements with distinct rules for the new
commonage but have been unable to bring about any change in
the system of grazing across the old commons, although this is
also an important long-term objective. However, without a
substantial expansion of the land base, this goal of a wholesale
reform of communal grazing management is unlikely to
succeed.
For the new municipal commonage in Leliefontein, it is
proposed that stocking rates will be set according to a
commercial carrying capacity of 11 ha per SSU, providing extra
land for a total of 1,000 sheep and goats. A maximum of 75
small stock per farmer will be allowed within a specified camp
for a specified period of time as set out in a grazing agreement.
User fees of R1 per month per SSU are meant to cover the costs
of a shepherd or farm supervisor and infrastructure repairs but
are likely to be inadequate. Communal farmers will not be
allowed to build kraals, cooking shelters or huts on the new
commonage but must pool their stock within each camp where
they will be managed as if it were mini-commercial farm.
It is not surprising that so far only the wealthier communal
farmers have applied for access to these new farms. While there
may have been a presumption in favour of granting such leases
to poorer farmers, the logistics of using distant grazing land and
the requirement to entrust livestock to a paid herder within a
camp system are major disincentives to the majority of poorer
communal farmers. Under these circumstances, how is it
possible to reconcile the needs of communal farmers with the
constraints inherent in a commercial management system?
Farmers in Paulshoek (one of the closest villages to the new
commonage farms) generally express dissatisfaction with the
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consultation process carried out by the Leliefontein MK. It
seems likely that after the local elections (December 5, 2000) a
new MK will be formed in order to develop a management plan
which takes account of the broader needs of communal farmers.
Social and/or environmental sustainability?
he implementation of commonage projects in Leliefontein
has been ham-strung by the ideology of the commercial
management model, making the delivery of an expanded
land base to the poorest all but impossible. The
justification for this has been based solely on normative
perceptions of what constitutes sustainable management
practice. This policy has prevailed locally in spite of a national
programme which favours flexibility in the creation of such
management agreements:
[T]he Department [of Land Affairs] is also aware
that, for too long in South Africa, inappropriate
planning norms have been imposed upon black people
[ . . . ] it is essential to take due account of what the
grant applicants themselves believe will improve their
lives and not to lose sight of the very limited choices that
poor people have (White Paper on South African Land
Policy  DLA 1997).
While the national programme favours flexibility, should this
happen at the expense of sustainability?  Herein lies the
problem: do we define sustainability using conservative
commercial models based on carrying capacity, or are there
other more flexible models we can draw on which better
accommodate the needs of poorer communal farmers?
The effectiveness of land reform in improving the socio-
economic future of communal residents will depend to a large
extent on the land management model that is ultimately
implemented. The current model for the management of the
new Leliefontein farms is not a good one for communal farmers.
It is expensive, foreign and in many senses unworkable.  It will,
however, provide for a sustainable ecosystem. The dilemma is
how to marry this with the needs of communal farmers.  How
can a management system be developed that accommodates the
aspirations and knowledge of communal farmers without
compromising the integrity of the landscape beyond acceptable
limits? This dilemma revolves around the judgement of what
T
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constitutes long term sustainable land use as weighed against
the pressing needs of people who have been systematically
marginalised, in part by being forced to subsist on a densely
populated and intensively grazed land base.
Recent discussions within and between the Farmers
Associations of Leliefontein and the MK continually reiterate
an awareness of the need for a scientific and environmental
approach (Rodkin 1999) to the management of the commons.
And yet, with respect to grazing regimes and long-term
ecological degradation and recovery, the science is incomplete.
Historical evidence from Paulshoek shows that significant
environmental change took place within the village rangelands
around 50 years ago with decreased vegetation cover remaining
more or less constant since then. Vegetation cover on
neighbouring commercial farms was in a similarly overgrazed
state in 1960 when fencing first divided the commercial from
communal lands. Improved vegetation cover and the recruitment
of palatable perennials on commercial farmland adjacent to
Paulshoek occurred over the next 20 to 30 years due to lower
stocking levels and rotational grazing. This implies that there
is an environmental cost to high stocking densities within
the communal system, but that this loss of natural capital is
recoverable over periods of time estimated to be between 30
and 50 years under controlled grazing conditions. In addition,
a significant proportion of the lowlands in Paulshoek have been
ploughed in the historical past. This has resulted in a complete
transformation of the vegetation from a mixed suite of palatable
evergreen and leaf succulent shrubs to a monospecific stand
of the unpalatable and toxic shrub Galenia africana.
Rehabilitation of these lands to a condition of high ground
cover and palatable perennial plants would take decades under
controlled grazing conditions similar to those which commercial
farmers adapted during the 1950s when they fenced their lands
into camps or paddocks.
It is paddocks such as these which are now being brought
back into communal tenure under the commonage principle
of the land reform programme. Just how these previously
commercial rangelands should be managed sustainably within
a communal system over the long-term is a consideration
confronting planners at the cutting edge of land reform
implementation.
In Paulshoek, one of the Leliefontein villages closest to the
new commonage lands, 93% of households subsist on incomes
of less than R1500 per month, and over half of all households
own livestock within 30 (often multiple ownership) herds. And
yet, only two farmers, (from the wealthy, emergent farmer
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category) have indicated that they might apply to use the new
commonage. Under a more flexible management system, the
new commonage could be used as an incentive for a
restructuring of the old commons if the additional land was
meaningful in terms of size, and if it were accessible to the
majority of stock farmers. Seasonal grazing within the new
commonage, if made available on this basis, could be used
as part of an expanded communal system in order to give old
overgrazed areas a chance to recover during flowering and
seedling establishment phases of palatable vegetation as well
as acting as a flexible grazing reserve during drought. Such a
system would be predicated on the willingness of a large
proportion of Paulshoek farmers to take part in such a
transhumant grazing system. It would depend upon the farmers
of Paulshoek applying to the municipality as a group in order to
lease a portion of the new commonage (one of the farms) for this
purpose. It would require the MK and TLC to allow the building
of kraals and temporary housing. It would also require
permission for periodic high stocking densities and periods of
complete rest. Is this realistic? Can the Leliefontein MK find
ways to make the new commonage available to the poor and
disadvantaged?  Would the 10 discrete villages of Leliefontein be
a more appropriate focus for leasehold arrangements with the
TLC since they already act as discrete social and political
entities?
We feel obliged to ask whether or not the commitment to a
scientific commercial rangeland model merely serves as a
convenient means to divert attention away from an underlying
political agenda. The adherence to commercial management
principles and the effective privatisation of Leliefonteins new
commonage will only be to the advantage of the richest stock
owners among the communal farmers and deny the majority
access to the benefits of the land redistribution programme.
The parallels with the mind-set of the old Reserve Management
Board and the similarities of the new commonage to the
economic units of the 1980s cannot simply be dismissed.
Furthermore, we must ask what has become of the
governments commitment to land reform as a means of poverty
alleviation? This commitment seems to have been displaced by a
monetarist macro-economic policy geared towards the creation
of a black middle class. Agricultural policy has followed suit. It is
not the first time that the dogmatic adherence to commercial
land management models has served the interests of an
emergent black elite. Kenya and Botswana (among others)
provide classic examples of the negative socio-economic and
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environmental consequences for poor rural communities which
result from the imposition of land policies modelled upon private
land ownership and commercial production systems (Behnke
1993; Ellis & Swift 1988; Homewood & Rodgers 1987; Lane &
Swift 1989; Sandford 1983; Scoones 1995).
Stepping stones or economic units reborn
he wealth differentials that exist between communal
farmers are often cited as a prime reason for the reform of
communal tenure. Wealthy farmers are portrayed as free
riders who exploit the commons at the expense of the
poor. Giving incentives to the largest farmers to leave the
commons and become commercial farmers themselves is often
seen as the most appropriate means of reducing communal
livestock numbers, and at the same time providing better
grazing for poorer communal farmers. Because of their capital
reserves and the fact that they often own cars or bakkies (pick-
up trucks) and have the ability to hire labour, these are the
most likely candidates to become emergent commercial
farmers. We regard such reasoning as flawed on several
grounds. In the first place such wealth disparities are
insignificant when viewed against the socio-economic
inequalities that exist within South Africa as a whole. Secondly,
wealthy communal farmers often employ herders from within
the community, thereby contributing a small but important
element to the local economy, especially to the poorest
households.  The costs to rural communities of removing
entrepreneurial households in this way should not be
underestimated: wealthy individuals provide jobs and services
that are an important part of the complex process of developing
a prosperous rural economy. Finally, given the governments
restricted budget for land redistribution, the choice of whether
or not to target black emergent commercial farmers or the poor
is purely political.  We believe that priority should be clearly
focussed on poverty alleviation in the Namaqualand communal
areas rather than on the creation of a black elite.
During the first half of 2000, there was a major shift in land
reform policy away from poverty alleviation and the redistribution
of land to the poor, towards the facilitation of land acquisition by
emergent black commercial farmers. New criteria for
commonage projects state that:
[. . . ] commonage should be seen as having a dual
purpose, i.e. that of providing access to land for
T
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supplementing [subsistence] income and as a stepping
stone for emergent farmers. This means that all
commonage projects must accommodate both
subsistence and emerging farmers (DLA 2000).
Now, not only do communal farmers in the Leliefontein area
have to conform to a commercial management system in order to
qualify for access to the new commonage land, but the old policy
which favoured the most disadvantaged communal farmers has
given way to one which now splits this priority with the
wealthiest. How are the many contradictions inherent in these
criteria to be resolved?
NGOs working in Namaqualand have welcomed this policy to
the extent that it proposes to remove the larger farmers from the
commons and thus enhance the prospects for subsistence
farmers on commonage and communal land (SPP 2000:1). But
will the new commonage lands actually act as stepping stones
for the small number of wealthier communal livestock owners
who fit into the category of emergent commercial farmers (DoA
& DLA 2000)? Are the grant incentives enough to entice such
farmers off the commons? We will try to answer this question by
projecting the recommended grant levels as set out in the
Integrated Programme of Land Redistribution and Agricultural
Development (MoA 2000) in the context of commercial herd
sizes, gross profit margins and land prices in Namaqualand.
Two basic emergent farmer business plans will be calculated
using prices and productivity values current in the commercial
farms surrounding the eastern portion of Leliefontein.17
Scenario 1
An emergent farmer needs to obtain a loan on top of the
Integrated Programme grant to purchase 1100 ha of land at
R135/ha with a stocking rate of 11 ha per SSU. The grant based
on total project costs is calculated on the basis of the value of
his own-contribution, including his livestock, the value of a
bakkie and a years own labour.
Project Finance:
1100 ha of land @ R135 R148, 500
Own contribution
Value of 100 breeding ewes R 25,000
Bakkie R 10,000
Labour R   6,000
Total own contribution R  41, 000
Total project cost R189, 500
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Financed by:
Own contribution R  41,000
Grant R  43,317
Loan R105,183
Total finance R189, 500
Profit/Loss:
Gross margin per ewe x 100 R 13,400
Interest payment @ 17%18 R 17,881
Gross profit/(loss) (R 4, 481)
In order to break even, the farmer in Scenario 1 will either
have to boost his gross margin by increasing the stocking rate to
8 ha per ewe or provide more than R27, 000 in cash towards the
purchase price of land in order to reduce interest payments. In
order to make a small profit to provide a safety-net income of R1,
500 per month the farmer will have to provide the full purchase
price of the land in cash and reduce the stocking rate to less
than 10 ha per ewe.
The problem is magnified when the scale of the commercial
operation is expanded. In Scenario 2 an emergent commercial




Cost of 3,300 ha of land R445, 500
Own contribution
   (300 ewes, bakkie and labour) R  91,000
Total project cost R536, 500
Financed by:
Own contribution R  91,000
Grant R100,000
Loan R345,500
Total finance R536, 500
Profit/Loss:
Gross margin per ewe x 300 R  40,200
Interest @17% R  58,735
Gross profit/(loss) (R18, 535)
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Scenario 2 assumes that our emergent farmer could obtain a
loan of R345, 000. In order to break even he would have to raise
the profit margin by increasing the stocking rate to levels of 7 ha
per SSU or contribute R110, 000 in cash towards the purchase
price of the land. This would reduce his loan requirement to
R235, 000 with annual interest payments of R39, 950 (or the
equivalent of total gross profit). Even in a best case scenario
where our farmer provided all the cash for the purchase of the
land (R345,500) and therefore was relieved of interest
payments, income would be only about R3, 000 per month.
Neither of these scenarios take account of full variable costs,
depreciation on capital investments such as fences and pumps
or leeway for drought years when profits are greatly reduced.
The gross margins are calculated for conservative stocking rates
and it is unlikely that under high livestock densities that gross
margins of R134 per ewe could be maintained. It is clear that
either grant levels must be raised or interest rates on loans
must be reduced substantially before real incentives will exist
for black emergent commercial farmers to buy land in
Namaqualand. The realities of livestock production in this arid,
marginal environment, coupled with the lack of capital among
emergent commercial farmers and the current inflated price of
land in Namaqualand make it highly unlikely this objective will
succeed. It also goes a long way towards explaining why so little
land comes on the market in Namaqualand. The high risks and
low returns from capital invested are such that the few land
deals which do take place are typically by existing farmers
trading up to better farms while selling poorer, marginal land
to the government for inflated prices.
At best, the new commonage will provide economic
opportunities for the wealthier communal farmers, at the cost of
alienating these lands from the poorest. Rather than acting as
stepping stones, the new commonage farms will become a
reborn version of the discredited economic units.19 The policy of
promoting black commercial farming and the concomitant
diversion of scarce funding and human resources to this new
programme will seriously exacerbate the delays in addressing
the land needs of the rural poor who constitute the large
majority of Namaqualands rural population. (Cousins 2000).
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Conclusion and Post-script
policy focus on emergent commercial farmers in
Namaqualand will, contrary to the main purpose of land
reform, not lead to poverty alleviation within the old Act 9
Areas.
At best it will help preserve the status quo, at worst it will lead to
further marginalisation of small-scale communal farmers
through the alienation of commonage lands and the imposition
of commercial principles (e.g. management plans, restrictions
related to carrying capacities) to control the management of the
remaining communal areas.
The new Integrated Programme of Land Redistribution and
Agricultural Development (MoA 2000) is the latest in a series of
land reform policy shifts, brought about during the Mbeki
presidency under a new Minister of Agriculture and Land
Affairs. Many of the land reform policies discussed in this paper
have been superseded by a World Bank style programme which
seeks to unify all previous programmes within one system based
on a sliding scale of grants for agricultural projects.
Municipalities and other government bodies will no longer be
eligible purchasers of land under the new Integrated
Programme. However, associations such as CPAs or community
trusts are now able to apply directly to DLA to purchase
communal grazing land under this new policy. While many of
the criteria and terms relating to eligibility and procedures need
to be clarified, our reading of the policy suggests that a village
such as Paulshoek, were it to constitute itself as a CPA or trust,
could apply for a commonage grant of R20, 000 per household,
providing each household could also contribute R5, 000 either
in cash, kind or labour. In principle, Paulshoeks 140
households could raise R2.8 million in grants to buy an extra
20,000 ha of commonage  effectively doubling the land base of
the village. As a CPA whose membership would be all residents
of the village, it could act as a powerful incentive to reform the
management of Paulshoek common grazing land and
rehabilitate the old commons.
Unfortunately, the land reform budget only allows
approximately R4 million per year for land acquisition in
Namaqualand20, the equivalent of about 1% of the annual
national land reform budget. At current prices, a meaningful
redistribution of land would require an additional 1.2 million ha
of land (25% of Namaqualand) - enough to swallow up several
years worth of the entire national land reform budget.21 To be
realistic, this programme is unlikely to come anywhere near to
A
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achieving its aim of transferring 30% of Namaqualands
agricultural land during the next fifteen years.
The successful implementation of the new Integrated Policy in
Namaqualand is ultimately dependent on a reduction of inflated
land prices. A tax on commercial farmland would have an
immediate impact on the market with beneficial results for
group commonage projects and emergent black commercial
farmers. Meanwhile the future of the Act 9 Areas and the new
municipal commonage remains uncertain. Many questions as to
the ultimate ownership, control and management of the
communal lands have yet to be decided through ongoing local
democratic processes. We hope that this paper will make a small
but positive contribute to the resolution of some of these
problems.
Notes
1. We maintain the commonly used terms communal and
commercial even though we acknowledge that these
concepts are problematic since commercial activities are
indeed also taking place in the communal areas.
Alternative concepts could be people-intensive and land-
intensive systems.
2. The Leliefontein area includes different vegetation or veld
types: Namaqualand Broken Veld, Succulent Karoo, False
Succulent Karoo and Mountain Renosterveld (Acocks 1953).
The area receives winter rainfall, usually from May to
September, with a precipitation that varies from 100 mm to
350 mm.   Traditionally, Nama herders exploited the various
agro-ecological zones between the coastal plain, the
mountainous escarpment zone and the summer rainfall
grassland interior through seasonal transhumance.
Commercial farmers mimic this pattern today through the
multiple ownership of farms in different agro-ecological
zones.
3. A detailed economic analysis of commercial and communal
livestock farming is discussed below.
4. Market prices of grazing land in Namaqualand are as much
as 10 times higher than the productive value of the land
(SPP 2000). Research conducted into incomes from livestock
farming in the Paulshoek area (Global Change 2000) show
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that net annual income per hectare is less than R10 per ha
for communal and commercial farming systems. Currently,
land in this area is changing hands for more than R135 per
ha or more than 13 times the annual productive value while
base lending rates are around 20%.
5. A typical 10,000 ha farm might have a minimum of 40
kilometres of shared boundary fencing and up to 60
kilometres of internal fencing.
6. Paulshoek is one of ten Leliefontein Communal Area
villages. It has a population of approximately 800 people
living in 140 households. Paulshoek is the study site for an
interdisciplinary research project (Global Change 1998,
1999a, 1999b & 2000) since 1997.
7. These data reflect the low stock numbers during 1998-9
after several years of below average rainfall (Global Change
1999a).
8. All the data quoted in this paragraph are derived from a
study by Anseuw et al, 1999.
9. This information is derived from a study conducted during a
drought year. Output from Paulshoeks rangeland during
above average rainfall years is likely to be significantly
higher.
10. Similarly stark contrasts are evident between commercial
farms: overgrazing in Namaqualand is not a phenomena
confined to communal grazing systems.
11. Since May 2000 this has been designated as either a
housing/settlement grant or as a livelihood/ food safety-net
grant and the latest Integrated Programme document states
that grants ranging from R20,000 t0 R100,000 will be made
available for individuals and groups for grazing and
agricultural land acquisition.
12. See Municipal Structures Act 1998 and Municipal Systems
Bill 1999
13. From both a practical and political perspective, it seems
likely that the newly acquired commonage in Namaqualand
will be included in the transformation process.
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14. Three are elected Councillors, 3 are members of the land
committee, set up in 1995 to identify willing sellers of
commercial farm land, and 3 are members of village farmers
associations. There are nine representatives for ten villages
because Rooifontein and Komassies are represented by one
councillor.
15. During droughts when carrying capacities are reduced, the
Council will enforce recommendations made by the
Department of Agriculture to reduce a percentage of all
herds larger than 20 breeding ewes.
16. Total area of the old Leliefontein commons is 192,000 ha.
Additional commonage of 11,000 ha has been added under
the land reform programme. A further 18,000 ha, also
situated in the northwest, is due to be transferred to the
TLC in the near future.
17. Assumptions include: 90% weaning rate, 8% ewe mortality,
culled ewes are valued the same as ewe lamb replacements,
current prices of R235 per lamb (R15 per kg. x 17 kg.
carcass minus transport and  commission). One hundred
ewes produce 90 weaned lambs of which 27 ewe lambs are
kept as herd replacements. Sixty-five lambs and 16 culled
ewes are sold giving a gross income of R19,035 per annum
for 100 breeding ewes or R190 gross income per ewe.
Variable costs of R56 per ewe include veterinary medicines,
feed, tranport and maintenance but not labour, interest
payments or bank charges. Gross margins per ewe under
such a scenario are R134. No allowance has been made for
capital depreciation.
18. Wellman & Murray 2000
19. There are important differences between the economic units
initiative and the black commercial farmers programme that
we should not lose sight of: people are not being forced to
relocate from existing locations into less productive options;
anyone is allowed to apply i.e. there is no lower limit on
stock numbers; preference is supposed to be given to poorer
herd owners, even though it is in letter only.
20. Harry May, SPP pers. com. March 2000
21. According to the Integrated Programme (MoA 2000: 13) the
national budget over 15 years is expected to be in the region
of R 5.5 billion or R 360 million per year.
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